Dossier: The Abduction Legend or how Eichmann came to Jerusalem?

SS Lieutenant Colonel Adolf Eichmann

 

 

 

By Gabriela Weber

 

 

DEUTSCHLANDFUNK

Cultural background / radio play

Editor: Karin Beindorff

Dossier: The Abduction Legend or how Eichmann came to

Jerusalem?

Gaby Weber

DLF / SWR 2011

 

 

 

First broadcast

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Show: Friday, 4th March 2011, 19.15 - 20.00

Atmo: Radio announcement in English and German. Discussion

begins.

 

Author:

April 1961. In Jerusalem, the trial of SS Lieutenant Colonel Adolf

Eichmann, the Organizer of the deportations to Nazi death

camps, began. This dominated the headlines of the world's public

for months.

Almost a year before, on 11 May 1960, the Israeli Foreign

Intelligence Service had kidnapped Eichmann from his hideout in

Buenos Aires. Three of these Mossad agents, among them their

chief, Isser Harel, wrote books on their "heroic deeds". Today, the

world's press repeats their version. But it has long been known

that Eichmann's hideout had already been leaked at the

beginning of the 50s. What lies behind the legends about this

abduction and trial? Do they really only have to do with the crimes

of National Socialism? Was not perhaps Hans Globke, Chancellor

Adenauer's right-hand man and commentator of the Nuremberg

Race Laws, involved? What were the relationships at the time of

the Eichmann trial between Chancellor Adenauer and Israeli

Prime Minister Ben Gurion? What role did the most important

intelligence services of the Cold War, the CIA and the KGB, play

in this? Why many documents are in this case still kept secret?

And might there perhaps even be a military link?

For years I have been driven to seek answers to these questions

in both interviews and archives. Finally, after taking the

Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND)—the German Intelligence

Agency, to court, they finally had to grant me some insight, albeit

partial, into all of this.

Announcement:

The Abduction Legend or how Eichmann came to Jerusalem?

A feature by Gaby Weber

Speaker:

Adolf Eichmann grew up in Linz. By June 1933, he worked for the

Vacuum Oil Company, which belonged to the Rockefeller-empire.

Then he moved to Nazi Germany and became "an expert on

Jewish affairs" with the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), the Security

Service of the SS. In 1938 he headed the "Central Office for

Jewish Emigration" in Vienna. And in January 1942, he wrote the

minutes for the "Wannsee Conference", on which the "Final

Solution" of the Jewish question was decided. Eichmann then

took over its administrative implementation. After 1945, he went

into hiding until 1950, when he was able to travel on the so-called

"rat line" to Argentina, with the help of the Vatican.

Author:

Until this moment, the story is undisputed. What happened next

has received hardly any attention. Historians have so far scarcely

touched the matter of these Nazi exiles and the laundering of the

so-called 'Nazi gold'. Thousands of Nazis stayed on in Argentina,

up to a total of 50,000 has been mentioned. However, they only

planned to stay until 1965 since the statute of limitations was, at

that time, twenty years. They were not only tolerated in South

America, but even courted.

Speaker:

Adolf Eichmann began by working on the tunnel under the Paraná

River, a major project with the German company Hochtief,

subsequently on a power plant with Siemens, and from 1959 he

was with Mercedes Benz.

Author:

The Argentine President Juan Domingo Perón was hoping on

receiving technological expertise from these German Refugees.

And the branches of the German companies involved - most

notably Daimler-Benz - were able to live high on the hog on the

Rio de la Plata with the hidden capital they had siphoned away

during the Second World War.

Speaker:

The Cold War was also in full swing on the South American

continent. The Secret services of both East and West were

watching the operations of the "brown exiles" very closely.

Author

But no one, apparently, wanted to bring these people to justice.

The German Federal Intelligence Agency (BND) had former Nazi

Army officers working at all levels. And the Western services, and

even the KGB, were also happy to use the old comrades for their

own spy networks.

I was able to discover some notes on this nest of Nazi spies in the

files of the BND. German foreign intelligence possessed in

Argentina, and I quote, "many good connections," informants,

undercover agents, and sources. US-Services also had their

informants, one of whom was the war criminal Willem Sassen.

The CIA had known about the whereabouts of Adolf Eichmann

since 1954. However they had no interest in arresting him. At

least, not in 1954. Four years later - on 19 March 1958 - the BND

once again informed the CIA about his location and aliases.

Eichmann had now fallen into the crosshairs. Exactly when his

contacts with Soviet Intelligence began is not clear from BND

files. It was probably when his brown associates made contact

with the Ministry for State Security of the GDR in the late 1950's.

Speaker:

Beginning in 1956, Adolf Eichmann reluctantly agreed to

interviews for the purpose of writing down his memoirs. The rights

to these interviews, which dragged on for two years, were

reserved for Eberhard Fritsch and Willem Sassen. In Argentina,

Fritsch was editor of the Nazi paper "Der Weg" (The Way). The

German prosecutor in Lüneburg started a penal investigation

against Fritsch for "subversion". The German Internal Intelligence

Service (Verfassungsschutz) also began watching Fritsch during

his visits to Germany. Quoting from BND files:

Citation:

"Fritsch is offering the Eichmann material to German offices for

DM 80,000 to DM 100,000. He has shown a reliable agent photo

copies of some sample sheets."

Speaker:

A leading figure of the Nazi exile was Hans-Ulrich Rudel, a highly

decorated aviator and Stuka pilot of the Second World War, and

founder of the "Freikorps" (Free Corps) in Germany, which was

equally opposed to Communism and to the integration of the

young Bonn republic into NATO. In 1953, the Freikorps was

outlawed following pressure from U.S. authorities. According to

the BND, Rudel had established contacts with East Berlin:

Citation:

"On his last visit to Germany, Sassen made contact with Rudel,

and there are persistent reports that his political activity is under

the influence of Pankow. It has been confirmed that Sassen was

in Leipzig and Dresden".

Speaker:

The Dutch SS officer Willem Sassen had received the death

penalty in Belgium, and had been condemned to twenty years in

his home country. However, this latter verdict is mysteriously

missing from the files of the National Archives in Amsterdam.

Citation:

"... we have no idea how this could happen "...

Author:

... the archivist told me, at my request.

Speaker:

Sassen was jailed at war's end but broke out twice. He ended up

in Buenos Aires with false papers, and wrote for LIFE and for

DER STERN. He also filed regular reports at the U.S. Embassy.

Citation:

"Sassen is thought to be playing both sides of the fence. He is

suspected of working both for "Gehlen" and for the Americans. Up

to this time he has no official passport. He claims that he is

working for a German organization about which he could say

nothing. It is led by a prominent German General whose name

begins with G. He has recently (1959) been in East Germany. In

contrast to an earlier period Sassen has ample funds."

Speaker:

Although the Netherlands only took his name off the wanted list

1969, Sassen received a West German passport in January 1959.

Why? - the Foreign Office later wanted to clarify this. But the

BND would not give out this information, only replying laconically:

Citation:

"We have no knowledge here on the question of the nationality of

Sassen."

Speaker:

The German Internal Intelligence Service did indicate that Sassen

was a member of the Waffen-SS. But:

Citation:

"He was not a member of any other national-socialist

organizations, according to a DC Extract."

Author:

DC here means "Document Center", then still under U.S.

administration in West Berlin. How this repeatedly condemned

war criminal came to have a pleasant file [at the DC] is as strange

as the issue of his West German citizenship.

Speaker:

An undercover agent of the BND reported on the discussions

between Sassen and Eichmann.

Citation:

"As of the beginning of 56 Eichmann had reluctantly been

persuaded to write down his memoirs. This material had an initial

size of 3000 pages. However, on revision it ended up as 800 DINA-

4 pages. This was the version that was being offered."

Author:

The entire 3,000 pages are probably in the archives of the secret

services. There are fragments of these in the Federal Archives in

Koblenz, after being censored and passed through several hands.

They almost completely exclude the post-1945 period. The name

of the Commentator of the Nuremberg Race Laws, Adenauer's

Secretary of State Globke, is barely mentioned. In the BND files

on the other hand, there are numerous indications that, in the

original version, Eichmann had extensively expounded on Hans

Globke's participation in the extermination of the Jews.

Citation:

"Statements about an alleged correspondence between the

Governor General (Poland) Hans Frank and Globke about the

"too soft and indecisive attitude" of Eichmann. As part of the final

solution the Nuremberg Laws should serve as the basis. The

main sections of the material definitely deal with Globke and with

many other leading figures in the Federal Republic."

Author:

Three strands run through the matter of Eichmann, his abduction

and trial. Plot number one concerns Adenauer's Secretary of

State Hans Globke, against whom the Frankfurt Prosecutor

General Fritz Bauer would weigh in on, and for whom Eichmann

was a threat. Bauer was a Jew, a Social Democrat and

Antifascist. In the anti-Communist climate of the Cold War such

people were looked upon with suspicion. The vast majority were

strictly against any elucidation of German crimes. Plot number

two concerns the Israeli interest in their own secret, nuclear

program. And Plot number three deals with the Allied summit of

16 May 1960 in Paris, where the future of Berlin and the division

of Germany would be discussed. High-ranking ex-Nazis tried to

re-enter the fray through their own contacts with the intelligence

agencies on both sides of the Cold War.

Speaker:

As Ministerial Advisor to the Reich Interior Ministry, Hans Globke

had arranged that his 'Commentary on the Racial Laws' would

also be "applied" against the Jews of the countries under

occupation by the Wehrmacht. These people were deported to

the death camps, and their property confiscated.

On 11 February 1959 the "Neue Rhein Zeitung" reported that

Globke played a role in the "Merten Affair." In April 57, the Berlin

lawyer Max Merten, once Military Council Agent

(Militärverwalltungsrat) in Thessaloniki, was arrested in Athens

and indicted there for war crimes.

In 1959 the military process in Athens was inaugurated. Merten

explained that in February 1943 he had warned Jews he had

known, about their imminent deportation. He had elaborated a

rescue plan with the help of the Representative of the

International Red Cross, René Burkhardt. Ten thousand Jewish

women should have been transported to Palestine on ships of the

Red Cross that were at anchor in the port bringing food. At

Burkhardt's request he had sent a telegram to Geneva. The

German Embassy thereupon expelled the Red Cross man from

the country. However he could not reconcile himself with the

failure of the rescue plan, and travelled to see Eichmann in Berlin.

Merten testified:

Citation:

"Eichmann thought that the plan for the emigration to Palestine

required the agreement of Globke, and told this idea of the Red

Cross to Globke by telephone. He received a sharp rebuttal from

him, as I heard. Upon completion of the call Eichmann (ran) back

and forth in his modest office like an injured bull, complaining

bitterly about "stupid bureaucratic idiots," as he put it."-

Speaker:

Merten presented evidence: the telegram to the Red Cross in

Geneva, and Burkhardt also confirmed the rescue plan to the

Court. Merten had indeed helped him in this.

Author:

But in spite of all exoneration — Merten was sentenced as a war

criminal to 25 years imprisonment. This example could have set a

precedent, and German Diplomacy pulled out all stops to prevent

this. A few months after this judgement, Merten was transferred to

Germany. How this was "manipulated" was outlined by Gustav

von Schmoller in this manner during his examination of witnesses:

Citation

"When Prime Minister (Constantinos) Karamanlis came on a state

visit to Bonn, during which the economic assistance of the

Federal Republic for the Industrialization of Greece was to be

discussed, Chancellor Adenauer informed him that the matter (of

Merten) had him very worried. Karamanlis promised him every

effort would be made to clean the matter up. And on the return

flight to Athens he decided, with no further ado, to have Merten

transferred back to Germany."

Author:

The Adenauer government paid. First, a loan assistance of 200

million marks, then follow-up financing of 100 million and

"technical assistance" of fifteen million.

Speaker:

When Merten and Attorney General Fritz Bauer first met, is not

clear from what is contained in the prosecutor 's files. It is thought

to be "spring 1960". Bauer had been investigating State Secretary

Globke, Adenauer's right hand man, for some time. Merten's

arrival was just what he needed. For Bauer was aware that

Globke's offences were about to lapse (for Statute of Limitations

reasons).

Author:

Mertens statement alone would hardly be sufficient for an

indictment against Globke. Bauer needed an additional witness,

and that could be Eichmann. The Attorney General had known of

Eichmann's residence in Argentina since 1957. He had tried

several times, in vain, to get the Israeli authorities to intervene.

And when Eichmann appeared in Israel as a prisoner on the 23rd

of May, 1960, Bauer at last thought he had his star witness

against Globke.

Speaker:

The main goal on the political agenda of the Israeli government at

that time was: an atomic bomb. The U.S. did not wish to help

since their Laws prohibited the manufacture of nuclear weapons

for other states.

Ben Gurion thus first asked the French for help. And they offered

a commitment for the construction of the Dimona reactor in the

Negev desert. But U.S. President Eisenhower exerted pressure

on Paris, and Charles De Gaulle had to back down. Instead, he

brought the West Germans into play.

Author:

Would Bonn, after all that Germany had done to the European

Jews, be able to reject the wishes of Jerusalem?

Speaker:

In December 1959, a high-level delegation of German Nuclear

scientists, including Otto Hahn, President of the Max Planck

Society in Göttingen, and nuclear physicist Wolfgang Gentner,

travelled to the Israeli Weizmann Institute. Both had worked on

the "Wonder-weapon" (Wunderwaffe) in Hitler's "Uranium Group"

(Uranverein). And four months later, the Cabinet granted three

million marks from the budget of the

Atomic Energy Ministry, for nuclear cooperation with Israel. The

Raw material - uranium - was sourced in Argentina, who gave a

total of 116 tons of so-called "yellow cake" to Israel. Now only the

money needed to build the nuclear reactor itself had to be found.

On 14 March 1960, two months before the kidnapping of

Eichmann from Buenos Aires, Adenauer and Ben Gurion met in

New York. It was a harmonious meeting, wrote the press—a

breakthrough to almost "normal" diplomatic relations. The mass

murder of the Jews was fifteen years ago, in 1952 the

"Reconciliation Agreement" had been completed—destitute

Jewish refugees in Israel would be helped to the tune of 3.5 billion

DM.

Author:

Adenauer and Ben Gurion agreed in New York to: "Operation

Business Friend" (Aktion Geschäftsfreund).

Speaker:

Excerpt from a memo from Karl Carstens, Secretary of State at

the Foreign Office.

Citation:

"During the meeting of the Chancellor with Mr. Ben-Gurion in New

York, was discussed the matter of German development aid to

Israel. The Chancellor agreed to Development Assistance, on a

commercial basis, in the form of a loan of DM 200 million per year

pledged over ten years. Other meetings between the Chancellor,

Minister Erhard, and State Secretary Globke were conducted, and

these concluded with an understanding whereby the first portion

of this year's allocation, namely 85 million DM, would be released

in June and July."

Author:

The payment was for a "development project in the Negev

desert." There, the Dimona Nuclear Plant was under construction,

including its hidden underground facilities. Karl Carstens noted in

Bonn:

Citation:

"Federal (Defence) Minister (Franz-Josef) Strauss met Ben

Gurion a few days ago. Ben Gurion came to raise the subject of

the production of nuclear weapons."

Speaker:

The Foreign Office was opposed to the financing of the Israeli

nuclear weapon.

Citation:

"The Israeli government still intended to use the forthcoming

economic negotiations primarily to secure financial support for the

proposed desalination plant for atomic purposes. This project has

been the subject of ongoing negotiations with the U.S.

government for some time. (...) The (German) Federal

Government has made scientific equipment for research work in

the field of nuclear energy, available to the Nuclear Physics

Department of the Weizmann Institute in Jerusalem. (...) Any help

we provide for an atomic project should, on no account, be used

for military purposes. However, this Department (Foreign Office)

is not in a position to judge how this might be prevented."

Author:

Carstens feared a deterioration of German-Arab relations if the

deal was announced. And this was the case, even before the first

payment:

Citation:

"The Ambassador of the United Arab Republic looked me up to

ask if it were true that the FRG in Israel was building a reactor. I

answered his question in the negative."

Author:

But Adenauer and his right hand man Globke won the day. They

negotiated only about details. And exactly at that time—23 May

1960, another bombshell burst: the news went around the world

that Eichmann, the

organizer of the murder of 6 million Jews, was sitting in an Israeli

prison. The BND was flabbergasted, Adenauer and Globke raged

about. Weren't they just recently sitting peacefully together with

Ben Gurion—and now THIS! What would Eichmann say in his

defence? Would he characterize himself as a transmitter of

superior orders, and constitute a huge danger for Hans Globke,

Adenauer's right hand?

Speaker:

The "Action Business Friend" was suspended. Banker Hermann

Josef Abs, member of the board of Deutsche Bank and of the

Supervisory Board of IG Farben in the Nazi era, raised concerns.

Citation:

"The magnitude of these wishes of Israel (are) are extremely

high."

Speaker:

Attorney General Bauer now opened an investigation against

Hans Globke, and the GDR began a campaign.

Speaker:

The BND began gathering spy reports from around the world on

the forthcoming [Eichmann] trial and its possible revelations:

Citation:

"A source reports that major (Argentina) military figures, including

the Commander in Chief, regard Eichmann as a double agent in

the employ of both Germany and Israel. This explains his

excellent relationships with respected members of the Jewish

community in Argentina. Extensive information will be found in his

possession. Eichmann will no doubt put this sound knowledge of

prominent former Nazis to good account during the forthcoming

hearings."

Speaker:

The BND sent the 'journalist' Rolf Vogel, son of a Jewish mother,

to Jerusalem. There he spoke with Prime Minister Ben Gurion and

handed him his Book "Israel, State of Hope".

Author:

Vogel introduced himself to Werner Pfromm, the Bonn Public

Prosecutor, as a "first degree half-breed" (Mischling ersten

Grades). Pfromm had once served as a high Nazi officer, and had

come once again to high honours as a lawyer in the services of

the Federal Government. It was precisely to him that Fritz Bauer

would need to hand over his case against Globke.

Speaker:

The journalist Rolf Vogel about his talks with Ben-Gurion:

Citation:

"The conversation turned to the press attacks against Secretary

of State Globke. Ben Gurion took pains to assure that he had

knowledge that Eichmann had expressed to his defence counsel:

"Globke, who is that? I have never heard the name. I do not know

him". Ben Gurion repeated this several times. He explained that

Eichmann's statement was reported by the soldiers who had been

present at the initial hearings with his counsel. The sympathies of

the Prime Minister and his entourage regarding the attacks in the

press (are) entirely on the side of Globke."

Speaker:

One should not, however, according to Vogel, exploit the words of

the soldier for public purposes.

Citation:

"I rather have the feeling they are counting on Servatius (the

defence lawyer) to bring the final clarification on this point."

Author:

This is what happened. Eichmann's defence counsel wrote to the

prosecutor without being asked:

Citation:

"My client has authorized me to declare that Globke is unknown

to him, and that he cannot recall having spoken to him at any

time. On the question of the Merten incident, he cannot remember

anything

concerning the action to rescue Jews from Salonika."

Author:

Ben Gurion had fulfilled his part of the bargain. He had prevented

an International Tribunal and had shut his prisoner down. In court,

Eichmann claimed he did not know Globke, and was silent about

all other critical events during and after the war. Neither did the

details of the Sassen interviews ever surface. Parts were sold to

the press, and CIA Director Allen Dulles personally ensured that

Globke's the name did not appear in them.

Speaker:

It was only during the Revision process when Eichmann was

already under sentence of death, that he raised the question of

Globke.

Speaker:

The judge refused, on procedural grounds, to issue Hans Globke

with a summons. Nothing now stood in the way for the payment

for the Israeli nuclear program, noted the Foreign Secretary on 25

August 1961.

Citation:

"Payments are to follow only after the end of the Eichmann trial,

this being understood to mean the completion of the whole trial

process, not just the actual verdict. The Eichmann Trial is due to

be fully complete on the 14th of this month. A week later

Secretary of State Globke will thus confirm that the conditions for

the loan commitment have been fulfilled." (see this document on

www.gabyweber.com)

Speaker:

Overall, the state-owned Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (the KfW)

paid out 630 Million DM.

Author:

KfW confirmed this payment, but claimed they no longer had a

single document in their possession. When I asked whether

interest was levied on this "loan" and whether it had been repaid,

it replied:

Citation:

"As a Federal Bank, the KfW winds down its order book of

projects such as those of "Action Business Friend" (Aktion

Geschäftsfreund) that you requested. (We respectfully ask) for

your understanding that we cannot speak about such transactions

in public."

Speaker:

Details on the German-Israeli "Action Business Friend" are to be

found at the Foreign Office. On the 31st of October 1961 the KfW

sent them the draft Loan Agreement with the "Industrial

Development Bank of Israel". In the interim, Eichmann had denied

any mention of Globke before the court. The first instalment of 85

Million D-mark was to be used for "infrastructure projects and

industrial development". The interest rate of between four and

five-and-a-half percent was to be repaid over eight years.

Author:

The original agreement was for a "credit on a commercial basis,"

but, in the following exchange of letters, this had morphed into

"government assistance". "The term 'commercial basis'," as per

the letters, was only "chosen for camouflage purposes." The word

"extortion" is not mentioned by the Foreign Office. However, the

"Action Business Friend" had nothing in common with an ordinary

treaty between two governments.

Citation:

"No clear documentation exists on the discussions between

Chancellor Adenauer and Ben Gurion. Although the partners did

indeed acknowledge the content of discussion in letters, and how

they had understood it, confirmation from the German side is not

available. The letter of the foreign party is reported to be in the

hands of Herr Abs. The legal position gives rise to a number of

doubts. Under Constitutional Law the German Chancellor may not

be in a position to enter into ten-year financial commitments

without Cabinet [approval], and in particular without [the approval

of] the Finance Minister and of Parliament. I also do not believe

that the Chancellor had understood the discussion in this manner.

Furthermore, there is no mutually accepted representation of the

content of these discussions."

Speaker:

The U.S. government was against re-armament in the Middle

East in the fifties, and to the spread of nuclear weapons. As early

as July '63 President John F. Kennedy had, in writing, called on

the Israeli Prime Minister to have the Dimona complex in the

Negev inspected. Five months previously, in February '63, the

Argentine government had decided to supply 100 tons of uranium

to Israel. Karl Carstens of the Bonn Foreign Office noted in

September:

Citation:

"The Secretary of State (...) was able to tell me in strict

confidence that, by an absolutely reliable method, President

Kennedy has learned of the measures taken by us. The

information had been deliberately limited to his person. From the

intimations of the State Secretary, I understand that the Israelis

have adopted the information."

Author:

What Kennedy thought of the German financing of Dimona is not

known. In November '63 he was shot, and the next U.S.

presidents did not officially raise any further objections to the

Israeli atom bomb. It is also not known what might have motivated

Ben-Gurion to have turned Eichmann over to the Israeli trial judge

without first informing his responsible German negotiating partner

in atomic matters? Did the U.S. government put pressure on Ben

Gurion, or promise him something "persuasive"? In any case the

CIA knew, even before the Mossad, where Eichmann was be

found.

Speaker:

A CIA document states:

Citation:

"The principal security branch involved in the capture was Shin

Bet (Internal Secret). (It) took Eichmann into custody in mid-May.

It was not until Eichmann was on route to Israel on an airplane

between Buenos Aires and Dakar that Rosen (The Israeli

Attorney General) was informed of the Shin Bet had stated that a

“deal had been effected between the Government of Israel and

Eichmann, the [latter being tired of hiding] and the former

[needing] something to [offset] the serious [blow] to its prestige at

home and abroad occasioned by the sale of arms to Federal

Republic of Germany. However, according to Belchenko, the

"capture" would also result in an increased budget for the security

forces.

Speaker:

The CIA puts the word "capture" in quotation marks ...

Author:

But what interest had the U.S. government in Eichmann's

capture? Where did he get in their way? Quote of the BND:

Citation:

"Eichmann had contacts with Soviet intelligence and was to be

transferred at the same moment as Khrushchev was proposing

that the SBZ (Soviet Occupation Zone = GDR) should abandon all

co-operation with former National Socialist members. Eichmann

has prepared a comprehensive roster of former Nazis currently in

the service of Pankow, including 220 members of the East Zone

KP (Communist Party), most importantly Trade Minister Merkel,

Minister of Agriculture Reichelt, President of the Supreme Court

of the GDR Schumann, and General Müller."

Speaker:

The note is dated 4 June 1960, shortly after Eichmann's arrest.

The source is given as Intelligent Agent 5473, who refers this to

"French Circles."

Author:

".. to be transferred at the same moment ... .. "The words 'same

moment' refer to the Paris Summit in May 1960. But what the

Soviets had meant by the word "transfer," (Überführung) and what

exactly their plans for Eichmann were, are not known to this day.

Did the "transfer" have anything to do with those Russian nuclearpowered

submarines that had been spotted in early February

1960 off the coast of Patagonia? For nine days they were bombed

by the Argentine Navy. But of its eight cluster bombs half did not

ignite, and the U-boats escaped. The U.S. Navy, which was called

in to help after a week, arrived too late. The Argentines were the

"laughing stock of all navies of the world," according to a

'Memorandum for Major Eisenhower'.

Speaker:

In 1960, the division of Germany was not yet sealed. The Berlin

Wall was only built in the following year. SED General Secretary

Walter Ulbricht had proposed all-German elections to Chancellor

Adenauer in January 1960. There were two conditions: all of

Germany was to be neutral, meaning no other military alliances.

And this new state should be "de-nazified. This meant for Bonn,

Hans Globke, Refugee Minister Theodor Oberlaender, and

Transport Minister Hans-Christoph Seebohm. In East Berlin this

meant the "220 members of the East Zone Communist Party.

O-Ton: "Pero la propuesta de la neutralidad ......

Speaker 1:

The German neutrality proposal made sense; it originated with

Stalin. Germany had been responsible for the Second World War.

Speaker:

Isidoro Gilbert joined the Argentine Communist Party in 1948. He

had been a correspondent for the Soviet news agency TASS for

thirty years.

Speaker 1:

And the Soviet Union well knew that they could not support the

GDR as economically as the Western powers could the Federal

Republic with the Marshall Plan. In the long run the GDR would

not be able to compete against West Germany, and the economic

Development of the two German states would run very differently.

But making Germany neutral meant to take away the United

States' closest ally in Europe.

Speaker:

At the Paris Summit on 16th May, 1960, Khrushchev planned to

propose a halt to all nuclear tests, to withdraw foreign forces from

Central Europe, and to establish a nuclear-free zone, according to

German Foreign Office files. NATO and the Warsaw Pact would

sign a non-aggression pact. In case of refusal of his proposal,

Khrushchev threatened to conclude a "Special Peace Treaty" with

the GDR.

This meeting had been in preparation for months. And of course,

the U.S. government knew about

the Soviet proposal of a unified neutral Germany, with Berlin as a

"free city".

Author:

Eisenhower would not or could not let that happen. He feared an

extension of Soviet influence in Europe and wished to establish a

nuclear weapons base closer to the Soviet border. He needed the

Federal Republic as a bulwark for the Cold War. Furthermore,

they shared a common anti-communist ideology. The U.S.

President therefore was not bothered about people like Globke

with a Nazi past.

The fact that these people could remain in Adenauer's cabinet

was a clear indication that he had no interest in the proposals of

the Kremlin—denazification in a united, neutral Germany.

For the Germans the reunification offer must have looked

tempting. And the congregation of Nazi comrades in Argentina

were in favour of this idea, and criticized the Bonn government as

"traitors" and "slaves of the USA".

The State Department needed a West Germany which, without a

peace treaty, was not sovereign and could be given orders.

Speaker:

Quote from a memorandum from the Chief of the U.S. Atomic

Energy Commission John McCone to

a ministerial meeting with Britain, France and the Federal

Republic:

Citation:

"It is the opinion of The Department of State that West Germany

has concluded that, for political reasons, they would not wish to

press for Germany´s re-unification".

Author:

But how could U.S. President Eisenhower publicly reject

reunification? Blame for the permanent division of Germany had

to be born by Moscow alone. There could also be no official

objection to Khrushchev's proposal about removing Nazis from all

government offices. Friendly winds were blowing from the East.

Eisenhower had to come up with something to scuttle the Summit.

The official history puts the reason for the failure of the Paris

Summit of May 1960 on the so-called U-2 affair.

Speaker:

On 1 May 1960 a spy plane was shot down over Soviet territory.

The CIA ran into severe criticism. Could not the U2 have been

despatched after the Meetings, it was asked? Or did the CIA

intend to deliberately provoke the Kremlin?

A secret report by Sherman Kent, CIA liaison officer to the

Summit, shows that the U2 affair was not the real reason for the

failure. The diplomacy of the two Great Powers in the days

following the shooting clarifies the situation:

Citation:

"On 5 May Khrushchev opened the first session of a meeting of

the Supreme Soviet. In his remarks he let go at the U-2 intrusion,

calling it a direct provocation, and threatening retaliation.

However, at the end of his speech he tempered the blast referring

to his commitment to the Leninist principle of peaceful

coexistence and to his intention to spare no effort at the Paris

meeting to reach agreement. Again, on 7 May on two occasions,

one in his remarks to the adjourning Supreme Soviet and the

other at an impromptu press conference, he came down hard on

the "espionage" aspects of the flight and the Soviet government's

sense of outrage, but said nothing to indicate that the USSR was

not going through with the meeting in Paris. A few days later, 10

May, our government received the Soviet official protest which

was couched without reference to the Summit. On 11 May at an

exhibit of the wreckage of the U-2 aircraft in Moscow, Khrushchev

again spoke with some violence, but noted only his government's

intention to take the issue before the UN Security Council and, in

the event of US obstruction, to the General Assembly. Nothing

was said of Paris. The next day Tass glossed these remarks in

such a way as to assure that the Soviet government felt that the

Summit conference should take place as planned."

Speaker:

In the Cabinet meeting after his return from Paris, Eisenhower

revealed:

Citation:

"It seems clear that the U2 incident was not the cause of the great

switch since Mr. Khrushchev himself has spoken of knowing for

so long about these U2 flights."

Author:

Khrushchev unexpectedly arrived in Paris two days before the

start of the conference.

Speaker:

On 15 May, the day before the summit, he met privately with De

Gaulle. What the two discussed is not known. But on the following

day Khrushchev left under protest, even though the meeting was

to last five days. At this time, Adolf Eichmann had already

"vanished" for five days. In the night of May 15 U.S. forces let the

sirens howl throughout the country. This was a threat, complained

Khrushchev in a letter to US Democratic Party senators.

Author:

McCone, head of the Atomic Energy Commission and hard-liner

in Eisenhower's cabinet, was against all of Khrushchev's

proposals, not only against a unified and neutral Germany. He

was particularly against the suspension of nuclear tests and

disarmament. This would have threatened the technological

superiority of the United States. McCone was concerned about

the "industrial-military complex" - the state and private research

centers and weapons manufactures: first and foremost: the

Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, a leader in the development of

nuclear warheads. In his internal memo written on 17 May 1960 in

Paris - as the summit had just failed:

Citation:

"Under Secretary Merchant and Ambassador Bohlen commented

to the effect that despite the climate of the Summit we would

continue the disarmament and test suspension negotiation at

Geneva. I stated that under no circumstances should we reach

the conclusion that we would continue these negotiations (...) I felt

that the American public press, the Congress and some segments

of the executive branch of the Government did not support

continuing of test suspension with the inhibiting effect on weapons

development. Messrs. Merchant and Bohlen (…) were working

under a plan to cause Khrushchev, and not the President, to

break off the Summit negotiations." John McCone.

Author:

If the summit had not collapsed due to the U2 affair - then what

happened between the 11th and 15th May to nullify all chances of

a Great Powers agreement? Khrushchev had still been full of

optimism on the 11th May, as stated in the internal CIA

memorandum, and on the 15th May he angrily left Paris after a

meeting with De Gaulle, and did not participate in the opening of

the Summit. Eichmann was caught and in custody throughout this

period. The parties involved are silent about what exactly took

place between the arrest on the 11th and the arrival in Israel on

the 22nd May—why he only appeared at his destination 11 days

later, and after the conclusion of the Paris talks. What did de

Gaulle tell Khrushchev about the kidnapping of Eichmann? Did

the Soviet leader reckon that a deal between Eichmann and the

KGB would be made public? Had his premature arrest foiled his

own plan to "transfer" the administrative organizer of mass

murder—and to use him as a bargaining chip in the German

question?

Many documents are obviously still secret—such as the letter of

CIA Chef Dulles to Eisenhower's National Security Advisor

Gordon Gray dated May 11th, 1960, the day of Eichmann's

disappearance. The letter consists of two pages, is marked "Top

Secret," and is in a folder titled "Eyes Only". I have requested it´s

release.

The State Department sent back my application for the release of

this information with the note "return to sender," and again

rejected my visa application without explanatory statement. I sent

a questionnaire to the CIA and requested the release of several

documents. The answer is still pending. I have asked the Atomic

Energy Commission and the Defence Ministry in Buenos Aires for

information regarding the mission of Mr. Herbert York who was

sent to Argentina on 15th of May, 1960. York had already worked

on the development of the atomic bomb during the Second World

War. He was the first director of the Lawrence Livermore

Laboratories, and in 1960 director of DASA, the Defence Atomic

Support Agency. Three days before his departure he had

presented a list of the latest weapons systems to President

Eisenhower in Cabinet. A nuclear test ban would have prevented

this development. Herbert York landed in Buenos Aires on the

same day that Eisenhower went to the Summit on disarmament in

Paris. York was accompanied by physicists and Marines. Shortly

before, and "accidentally" on the day of Eichmann's abduction,

seven U.S. aircraft, three U-2 spy planes, and four bomb carriers

of the type P-57, landed in Buenos Aires. And a day later, the

nuclear-capable strategic bombers with air refuelling of the type

KB-50 also arrived. They all remained for two days at Ezeizaairport,

and then flew together to an unknown destination. They

wished to undertake test experiments, "pruebas" — as stated in

the report of Argentine Military Intelligence, which I have received.

I have asked the Defence Department in Washington [for

clarification on] what these "test trials" of the U.S. Atomic Agency

consisted of. I am still waiting for a response.

Is, in the final analysis, this "heroic kidnapping of Eichmann by the

Mossad "just a red herring?

But why raise uncomfortable questions. Have they not everyone

gotten what they wanted?

The USA continued their nuclear weapons tests, and stationed

their missiles on West German soil. McCone became CIA chief.

They granted the Argentines a loan of 7.6 million dollars for its

steel and chemical industries. Ben Gurion received from Bonn

630 million D-mark for its nuclear reactor, and on the same day

on which the arrest of Eichmann was announced, the long

awaited promise from Washington's about ...

Citation:

“… electronic equipment, Hawk missiles, and various items "...

Author:

... as indicated in the letter of thanks to the State Department. And

something must also have been enough for the Russians to keep

their silence. All parties hold tight.

----------------

The Abduction Legend or how Eichmann came to Jerusalem? A

feature by Gaby Weber

You heard a co-production of Deutschlandfunk and with the

Südwestfunk, 2011

Speakers were: Ursula Illert, Hüseyin Michael Cirpici, Michael and

Hendrik Stickan Witte

Sound and technology: Michael Moran and Hanna Steger

Directed and edited by: Karin Beindorff