 |
| Max Weber and Carlos Marx |
 |
| Jorge Aliaga Cacho |
By Jorge Aliaga Cacho.
The aim of this essay is to discuss the view which suggests that Max Weber's work is a 'debate with the ghost of Marx', an essay title which perhaps would be more appropriate to parapsychology than sociology. However, the mystique found in the intellectual work of both writers makes this an exciting challenge. To discuss the proposition, frequently set to students of sociology in Britain and America, that 'Weber's sociology is a debate with the ghost of Karl Marx I would like, firstly, to introduce some facts which should help us in the development of our discussion.
It is important to remember that during Weber's Marxism was not a dominant political current and consequently the existing social thought of left and right was not influenced by Marxist assumptions. Moreover, the polarities of social thought did not have the same shape as today when we ask a question on the phantasmagorical nature of the intellectual relationship between these two German thinkers. However, it is true that in 1890, seven years after Marx's death, there was a theoretical synthesis between Marxists and scholars despite mutual political recriminations.
The 'topic' of our question had its origin when in 1945, German sociologist, Albert Salomon, argued that Weber 'became a sociologist in a long and intense dialogue with the ghost of Karl Marx' and that the main purpose of Economy and Society was the re-examination of the 'Marxian Sociological thesis'. (1) Others, like Gerth and Mills, added the suggestion that Weber was involved in a productive debate with the arguments proposed by historical materialism. However, despite that suggestion, the emphasis of Weber's intellectual work drifted towards Marx. Later, the loose interpretations of Marx's historical materialism and the 'all-inclusive' approach to Marxism have helped to find affinities between these two influential writers.
In my view, the last paragraph can be used as a framework to find an answer to our question and to discover to what extent Weber's social theory is a distorted reflection of Karl Marx´s work, 'the ghost figure' or something else. This intention can not be obtained easily given the fact that Weber did not give a detailed account of the intellectual influences which affected his work and therefore, to answer our question, our effort should be concentrated on looking at the substance of Weber's writing, aiming to reconstruct his theoretical position concerning that of Marx.
According to Bendix and Roth (op.cit.), Weber considered himself an opponent of Marxism and expressed its disagreement with the 'economic viewpoint' in vogue at that time in many political and intellectual areas. Weber remarked that 'a perspective advancing in such a self-possessed manner is in danger of succumbing to certain illusions and to overestimate the explanatory power of its own notions'....(2)
Weber also criticized Marxism for blurring the difference between technological and economical phenomena. According to Weber different superstructures could rest on the same kind of technology. Weber instead of emphasizing technology directed his attention to modes of appropriation and expropriation. This is another 'quasi-Marxist' position, but in fact, denotes a difference from Marxism (3).
Weber said the following to the Sociological Association:
'To my knowledge, Marx has not defined technology - There are many things in Marx that dot only appears contradictory but actually are found contrary to the fact if we undertake a thorough and pedantic analysis, as indeed we must. Among other things, there is an oft-quoted passage: 'The hand-mill results in feudalism, the steam-mill in capitalism'. That is a technological, not an economic construction, and as an assertion, it is simply false, as we can clearly prove. For the age of hand-mill, which extended up to modern times, had cultural 'superstructures' of all conceivable kinds in all fields'.
In my reading of "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" I find clearly expressed Weber's disagreement with Marx historical materialism, calling it a naive doctrine. As we know, Marx believed in a materialist interpretation of history in which the mode of production of material things laid down the social, cultural and political phenomena, giving causal priority to the economy rather than to ideas when trying to explain historical processes. Webber on his part believed that capitalism dominates economic life, 'educates and selects the economic subjects which it needs through a process of economic survival of the fittest. But here one easily see the limits of the concept of selection as a means of historical explanation. So that a manner of life so well adapted to the peculiarities of capitalism could be selected at all, i.e. should come to dominate others, it had to originate somewhere, and not in isolated individuals alone, but as a way of life common to whole groups of men'. (4).
Según Weber, este origen es lo que debe explicarse y, como dijimos anteriormente, Weber no creía que tales ideas fueran causadas por las estructuras económicas. El espíritu del capitalismo en América, "en el sentido que le hemos asignado", estaba presente antes del advenimiento del orden capitalista mismo. José Carlos Mariátegui, en 1928, llegó a una conclusión implícita. Al explicar la conquista católica en Perú, proponía que: 'el colonizador de la América sajona fue el pionero puritano, no se puede decir lo mismo, explicaba, del colonizador de la América española. que fue el cruzado, el caballero. El conquistador era de una estirpe espiritual el colonizador no. La razón está al alcance de cualquiera: el puritano representaba un movimiento en ascenso, la Reforma protestante, el cruzado, el caballero, personificaba una época que concluía el medioveo católico. (5).
We could, therefore, say that the ideas brought by the Anglo Saxons to América, the protestant reform, 'the spirit of capitalism', shaped the social, cultural and political phenomena that would be developed there. The movement to a capitalist society, according to Weber´s ¨The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism": was primarily caused by the habits, attitudes and beliefs of Protestantism and particularly Calvinism and Puritanism. the Puritans' industrious habits caused an increase of wealth which the ascetism of their creed did not permit them to consume. Hence the resources which the religion did not permit them to spend in idle pleasures were invested in the new economic capitalist formation.
For Weber, Marx's economic concepts are not clearly defined. For Weber economic behaviour means that which is intended to acquire resources which are also desired by others by means which excluded force and fraud. In Weber's opinion purely economic factors can act as the parameters within which non-economic behaviour is possible and that the economy itself is limiting, though, though not determining, influence on society. Weber believes that Marx's economic materialism dissolves under such examination.
However, I need to point out that Weber's work should not be seen as a direct response to Marx's work. Weber indeed had a general acquaintance with Marx at an early stage in his career but other influences, as Roth has pointed out, were far more important. Weber's early interests were rooted in orthodox problems of historical economics and law and when he uses the term 'historical materialism', the reference is to the flood of scholarly works claiming Marxian ancestry which appeared in the 1890s. The one which represents, in Weber's view, the vulgarisation of Marx's ideas, a departure from the main opinion of Marx's position.
I think that, if the last paragraph is correct, it would be necessary to untwist Weber's opinion on the validity and usefulness of Marx's work from his assessment of 'vulgar' Marxism.
Consequently, I would like to try to expose the similarities and differences between these two thinkers. Firstly, we must state that Weber recognises Marx's fundamental contributions to historical and sociological analysis. (6).
However, in Weber's opinion, Marx developmental conceptions can never be regarded 'as anything other than sources of insight, or at most, as ideal-typical concepts, which may be applied to illuminate specific historical and sociological analysis'. (7). According to Weber, Marx's attribution of overall rational 'direction' to the course of history is, between the terms of the Marxian framework, illegitimate and while admitting, with strong reservations, the use of developmental 'stages' as theoretical constructs which can be applied as a 'pragmatic means' to aid historical research, 'he rejects completely the formulation of 'deterministic' schemes based upon general theories of development' (8).
According to Georg Weippert, Weber thought that socialism was historically possible and his contribution to the theory of 'complete socialization' under the heading 'Rational Plan Economy' was meritorious. After the collapse, states Weippert, Webber pressed for 'planned socialization'. Nevertheless, Weber thought that socialism can not abolish man's control of men. According to him 'the tendency to bureaucratization gains ground with socialization'. (9). This is why in the political arena Weber tried to prevent socialism 'in the sense of complete socialization'. This point of view in the years 1916-1918 and immediate post-war were similar to the point of view of social democracy. Weippert acknowledges Weber's hate-filled phrases, postulated by Marcuse, which were directed not mainly against socialism and the socialists but against the dabblers in economic matters, those who could have created an excuse for the Franco-American invasion of Germany.
It has been said that if we had to express in one word the work of each of these thinkers, we would have to choose the word hope for Marx and pessimism for Weber. Marx clearly sees the struggle of the worker and the development of their class consciousness as precursors of a new fairer society in which workers would take control of the State. However, Weippert thinks that Weber admitted the adaptability of capitalism and that he fought for such modifications against the prevailing opinion of the bourgeoisie. He envisaged a long life for capitalism because of the high malleability of the free trade economy. During his time he stood firm when he pressed for the forming of free trade-unions and the collective work contract, and when 'he spoke so impressively to the employer's conscience, as to be open to the worker's claims and their right to freedom' (10). Weber seems to have been concerned to give capitalism popular appeal or 'social countenance', to use Weippert's term, and let the workers become economically and practice at home in the nation-state.
In response to Marcuse, Bendix has stated that: Weber´s writings have as their main theme, not abstract rationality as such, but its historical dependence and the possible irrationality of its consequences. The purpose of Weber's scientific approach is not 'to ignore everything human and historical' but to define conceptually the phenomena he deals with, to analyse more clearly their pre-conditions and conditions'. Bendix considers that these social presuppositions of scientific discussion and objectivity are Marx' views in the preface to 'Capital' when he compared his own analysis of England as a typical case 'with the physicist's methods of classifying types, although examples can also be found for Mars's use of the scientific character of his works as a polemic weapon.
Perhaps it would be helpful to note that Weber used the terms 'formal rationality o economic action' to design the extent of quantitative calculation of accounting which is technically possible and which is actually applied and 'substantive rationality' as the degree in which a given group of persons is, or could be, provided with goods through an economically oriented course of social action. This course of action, according to Weber, is a set of ultimate values no matter what they may be. In his interpretation, there is a variety of different possibilities. The term 'rational', in Weber'sinterpretation, is more precise of the meanings which are continually used in the discussion of socialization and evaluation in money and in kind. And the term 'formally' rationale is used according to the degree in which 'the provisions for needs, which is essential to every rational economy, is capable of being expressed in numerical, calculable terms, and is so expressed'. (11).
Reinhard Bendix states that in about 1890 Weber met Pastor Friedrich Naumann and collaborated with him in the Evangelical-Social Congress and helped him found the abortive National Association in 1896. Naumann and Gohre wanted to establish an anti- Marxist working-class party guided by the Christian idealism of educated men. Weber had his doubts about this combination and discussed it together with the Marxist indoctrination of the workers in Naumann's 'Die Hilfe' (Dec.6,1896):
'It would be a step forward to win over the upwardly mobile classes of the workers for a patriotic worker's party. This would mean the workers' intellectual emancipation. Freedom of thought is not tolerated by the Social Democratic party since it hammers Marx's fragmented system as a dogma into the head of the masses. As every city missionary in Berlín can report, among the Social Democratic freedom of conscience exists only in rhetoric, not in fact. However, in a class party, there would be no room for us, especially if you (Naumann) want to exert new pressure on conscience by demanding that the Christian faith be ´professed in political meetings... You should realize that a party that knows no other principle than 'Down with the haves' is the caricature of a party. All upwardly mobile strata of the population, including those of the working class, would, for this reason, become the natural opponent of the National-Social movement. You would retain only the bottom of society. A party which counts only on the have-nots will never size power. If you choose the criteria of the 'bleeding hearts' (miserabilistische Gesichtspunkte'), reminiscent of the Ethical Culture movement, you will become jumping jacks, people who, whenever their nerves are affected by the sight of economic misery, react by moving at one time to the right, at another to the left, sometimes against the agrarians, then against the stock exchange or big business. Such reactions do not amount to a political position'.
The last paragraph gave us a very rich picture of Weber's political stand. Weber considered himself an opponent of Marxism as well as of politically naive humanitarianism. Weber, as we said early, as opposed to the economic viewpoint in many political and intellectual areas. In 1895, Weber remarked 'a perspective advancing in such a self-possessed manner is in danger of succumbing to certain illusions and to overestimate the explanatory power of its own notions. However, the debatable question is whether, despite his political opposition to economic determinism and Marxism, Weber's early work was significantly influenced by the writings of Marx. Some have asserted a formative Marxist influence, e.g. Vernon K Dibble compared Weber's contribution to the agrarian surveys of the 'Verein fur Sozialpolitik' in the early eighteen-nineties and inferred from his study that 'Weber took Marx seriously, and learned from Marx'. Dibble observed that Weber had a much better grasp of economic group relations than the other five authors of his study who 'took an individualistic position or looked at the workers only from the employer's viewpoint'. (12)
Baumgarten thinks that Weber's dissertation of 1889 'On the History of the Medieval Trading Companies' has a viewpoint unmistakably oriented to Marx. Baumgarten's passage deals with the household as the original unit of production and consumption. Engels, in his 'Origin of Family, Private Property and the State' (1884), also view the household, and not the individual family, as the primaeval economic unit. (13)
However, according to Heusler, in ancient German law, the family was an organization of household members, not only of blood relatives. Weber as a law student was familiar with Heusler's work, therefore Weber's early views on the household cannot be seen having Marxist influence.
Weber's opinion about the ruthlessness of ancient capitalism was, in our view, not due to Marxist influence but because of his teacher Theodor Mommsen and Levin Goldschmidt, who held similar views about ancient capitalism.
Ernest Troeltsh also asserted an important influence or Marxism in Weber, the Marxian dialectic which was largely ignored by socialist theoreticians at the time. Otto Baumgarten refers to the influence of economic determinism which became fashionable in Weber´s generation and its politically most important variant -the Marxism of the labour movement in vogue before the First World War.
Troeltsh went further to assert a pervasive Marxist influence on Weber at the same time that he gave Marxism an all-inclusive, and hence highly indistinct, meaning. He argues that it is true that most academic scholars rejected the dialectic in either Hegelian or Marxian form. However, Troeltsh states that: 'one must not be deceived by a scholar's methodological declarations about his actual methodology'. (13).
In Troeltsh view the works of Plengue, Tonnies, Bucher, Sombart and Weber 'retained a dynamic view of the individual totalities....and an orientation toward the socioeconomic basis of all these historical movements and connections-features which separate this kind of research from the historical monographs that are completely alienated from any philosophical context and also from the kind of historiography that flirts with the merely causal laws of intellectual life'. For Troeltsh, Weber's enquires are fragments of an inclusive evolutionary and sociological view, which rethinks Hegelian and Marxian thought in a completely, if essentially sociological manner and provides historiography with new insights of the greatest significance. (14).
We can observe that Troeltsh's interpretations follow two directions, on the one hand, Weber's work appears influenced by Marx, on the other, it seems to transcend the Marxian dialectic. Bendix thinks that Troeltsh was trying to prove some bourgeois scholars better Marxians than the Social Democratic theoreticians, whose economic determinism and monism he scathingly criticized. (15). Was Troeltsh tempted to go beyond the evidence? Troeltsh's ambivalence, according to Bendix, is reflected in his obituary and perhaps in his refusal of MarianneWeber's request to speak at Weber's funeral.
However, what it is clear is that Weber recognises in Marx's writings some variations in the degree of sophistication with which his materialist interpretation of history is presented. In 'The Communist Manifesto', Weber believed, Marx expressed his views: 'with the crude elements of the genius of the early form'. (16). In 'Capital', Weber thought, Marx's interpretations were more thoroughly formulated. But even 'Capital', seems in Weber's opinion, to lack a precise definition of how the 'economic' is delimited from other spheres of society. Therefore, when Weber's attempt to distinguish between 'economics', 'economically relevant', and economically conditioned' phenomena can be seen as aiming to clarify this deficiency. In Weber's opinion, there are many forms of human action, which, while they are not themselves 'economic' in character, have relevance to economic activity. E.g. religious practice, I would add pacifist or, even, environmentalist actions. For Weber, the boundary lines of 'economic' phenomena are vague and not easily defined. The 'economic' aspect, according to Weber, is not only 'economically conditioned' or 'economically relevant'. In the introduction of 'Capital', written by Ernest Mandel, we find an interesting passage which, in my opinion, can resolve this argument quite differently: Each specific social form of economic organization has its own economic laws. 'Capital' limits itself to examining those which govern the capitalist mode of production. 'Capital' is therefore not a 'pure' economic theory at all. For Marx, 'pure' economic theory, that is an economic theory which abstracts from a specific social structure, is impossible...It would be similar to 'pure' anatomy, abstracted from the specific species which is to be examined'. (17). Mandel believes that Marx's theory of historical materialism includes comparative analyses and that these comparisons can result only from the analysis of specific modes of production, each with its own economic logic and its own laws of motion which can not be superseded by or subsumed under 'eternal' economic laws.
However, the most important respect in which Weber separates his views from those of Marx is the limits and the validity of their knowledge, and epistemology. We should remember that Weber was strongly influenced by a neo-Kantian view while Marx had a neo-Hegelian kind of viewpoint. From these epistemological standpoints came Weer's complete logical separation of factual and normative propositions,, the postulate of the irreducibility of competing values and for Marx the commitment to the 'scientific' ethic of 'ultimate ends', and thus the acceptance of a 'total' conception of history. Weber's conception of charisma, on the other hand, manifests his conviction that historical development can not be interpreted in terms of a rational scheme which expresses what is normatively valid.
According to Weber, Marxism attempt to represent the true course of events, to be the reflection of reality and of its development in the sense of a 'ratio essendi'. The French writer, Julien Freund, supporting Weber, has written that: 'those concepts indicate a misunderstanding of the probabilistic character of historical causality and that they are a contradiction with the very nature of science since there is no knowledge without presuppositions. Freund thinks that the purpose of Weber's methodology is to serve as a 'ratio cognoscenti 'As such, it is capable of discovering the flaws in doctrines which claim to reproduce reality and of determining the distance which separates their conceptual intention from the historical reality that they purport to reflect'. (18).
Ideologies in vogue during Weber's time considered capitalism from a narrow standpoint. Weber rejected that view. He considered capitalism an economic system which would long continue, in different forms, to direct the world economy. Capitalism in his view, can not be destroyed by a revolution pertain to the need for economic rationalization. Capitalism, for this reason, in Weber's view, will continue to influence the new social structures which men may establish. 'Value judgements and purely ethical disapproval are powerless in the face of the necessity of the facts'. (19).
To answer the essay question we also need to consider the ontological requirement, and from that perspective, we notice that, if it is true that Weber rejected the metaphysical and ontological basis of Marxist dialectic, it is also true that Weber accepted the relationship between economic activity and other human activities expressed in that philosophy. Weber's interpretation of Marx was based on the contemporary view of Marxism as a form of economic determinism. Marxists like Kautsky, were, in my view, Weber`s 'mirror of Marx', in which the political was assimilated to the economic. Contrary to that view Weber thought that 'the political was not a secondary and derivate phenomenon but an active, autonomous element exercising a critical role in the formation of modern society'. (20).
Capitalism, in Marx's view, was a system structured in class struggle and internal contradictions. For Weber, it was a rational mode of organization and very different from previous social formations. Weber's position in respect of political autonomy, as expressed in our last paragraph, and the spread of rationality between capitalism led him to disagree with the Marxist theory of the state as the instrument of class domination.
For Marx, property, or the lack of it, constitutes the basic category of all class situations. The factor which produces class is predominantly economic interest. Weber departs from the latter adding that skill also constitutes a form of property which produces class differentials: those offering services are differentiated 'just as much according to their kinds of services as according to how they make use of these services'. (21).
The latter is corroborated by Goldthorpe, quoted by J.E.T.Eldrige when he opined that Weber raises many questions about the relationship between occupational career and lifestyle. He thinks that questions of that nature are the ones which sociologists in this country have been looking at when considering the embourgeoisement thesis. Eldrige observes that the better-paid workers in Germany, as Weber noted, 'might be similar in incomes and even educational background to junior civil servants, clerks and members of the petty bourgeoisie. But did they manifest similar modes of family life, patterns of leisure, and religious affiliations? Further, between the working class as a whole could differences in lifestyle be observed and if so what criteria existed to account for them?' (22).
According to Weber, the stratification system developed in a capitalist society consisted of working classes, pretty bourgeoisie, 'intelligentsia'. such as engineers, bureaucratic officials and other white-collar workers and a class which occupies a privileged position through property and education. This complex stratification system does not give a simple relationship between Weber's class situation and class consciousness as conceived by Marx. Furthermore, Weber rejected the historical relation of class to social change, 'the concept of historically necessary objective laws of social development. (23). For Weber the empirical market situation structures consciousness and therefore he rejects Marx's notion of 'class for itself ', meaning, fully conscious of its historical interests.
Karl Löwith has stated that Marx and Weber are 'comparable' in terms of personality and achievement because they are of comparable stature. Lówith thinks that a comparison of one thing to another 'assumes that the objects compared are identical in certain respects' while differing in others'. (24). And he also considers that a comparison made by a third party presupposes that their respective aims of research should be distinguished about their idea of man; Löwith thinks that: 'this was not the deliberate and explicit goal in the research of Marx and Weber, but it was, nevertheless, their original motive'. (25).
The intention of the "Communist Manifesto" is practical-political while Weber's studies in the sociology of religion are inclined to the theoretical-historical view. However, according to Lówith, this does not preclude the possibility 'that the basic and original motivation for both Weber's historical 'research' and Marx's 'Manifesto' may, nevertheless, has been the one single and profound question concerning our contemporary mode of being human. (26). Marx in his 'Manifesto' provides an agitational critique of the 'bourgeois' while Weber on his part, in his first studies in the sociology of religion, produces a no less 'critical' analysis of the 'bourgeois' where the human being is differently evaluated. It is my view that both critiques are of importance in our historical situation.
Lówith considers that Marx and Weber combined the charisma of the prophet with the skills of 'journalism, advocacy and demagoguery', typical of the modern professional politician. He overcame 'science' in the narrow sense of specialization and politics in the narrow sense of partisanship. Marx on his part combined science and politics within the unity of 'scientific socialism', 'a theoretical practice and a practical theory'.
I find another point of divergence in the Weberian analyses of capitalism in terms of a universal and inevitable 'rationalization' which is an inherently neutral perspective but one 'which is evaluated ambiguously'. (27). Marx's interpretation, by contrast, is based on the ambiguously negative concept of a universal but transformable 'self-alienation. Rationalization and self-alienation are, according to Löwith, alternative characterizations of the fundamental meaning of capitalism.
If we accept Lówith suggestion that where Marx put the beginning of human history, there Weber saw the beginning of an ethic of irresponsible conviction. So we can say that the dissimilarities in their perspectives of interpretation of the modern bourgeois-capitalist world are very valuable. Each perspective, in my view, is better judged, by looking at the contributions which separately contribute to our understanding of humanity.
I would like to conclude by quoting Weber on 'Science as a vocation': 'The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the 'disenchantment of the world'. (28).
I would like to disenchant our essay question by accepting, instead of mirrors, or ghostly images, the idea that: 'everything is pregnant with its contrary'. (29).
Therefore, I could argue that Weber's work is not a debate with the ghost of Marx but an ongoing debate with a dialectical totality.
'No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals or...mechanised petrification.....(30).
Jorge Aliaga Cacho, MA, PGCE, Dip.Sp.
University of Glasgow
References
1 Quoted by Bendix and Roch in 'Scholarship and Partisanship', p.28, University of California
Press. Berkeley, 1971.
2 (op.cit), p. 234.
3 (op.cit), p. 234.
4 Weber 'The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism', p. 55, Allen and Unwin,
London, 1976.
5 J.C. Mariàtegui, '7 ensayos de interpretaciòn de la realidad peruana', p.170, Editora Amauta,
Lima, 1979.
6 Giddens, A, 'Capitalism & Modern Social Theory',p.193, Cambridge, 1992.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Stammer, Otto, 'Max Weber and Sociology Today, p. 152, Oxford 1971.
10 Ibid, p.153.
11 Weber Max, 'Theory of Social and Economic Organization`, p.170, Wiliam Hodge, Glasgow,
1947.
12 Bendix, R, Scholarship and Partisanship, p.235.
13 Ibid, p.230.
14 Ibid, p.230.
15 Ibid, p.231.
16 Weber, Max, 'Methodology of the Social Sciences', p.68.
17 Mandel, E, Introduction to Marx's 'Capital', p. 12.
18 Freund Julien, 'The sociology of Max Weber', p.137, Allen Lane The Penguin Press,
London 1968.
19 Ibid.
20 Swinged Wood, A, 'A Short History of Sociological Thought', p.182, Macmillan, London, 1991.
21 Ibid.
22 Eldridge J.E.T, 'Max Weber and Modern Sociology', p.110, Routledge, London, 1971.
23 Ibid.
24 Löwith, Karl, 'Max Weber and Karl Marx', p.23, George Allen & Unwin, London 1982.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Weber, Max, 'Science as a Vocation', p.155, inserted in 'From Max Weer', Routledge, London.
29 Marx, Karl, Quoted by Marshall Berman in his 'All That is Solid Melts Into Air, Verso, 1990,
London.
30 Weber, Max, 'The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism'.
